receiving newer supportive treatment. When the results of this combination of new factors were compared against the effects of the diagnostic methods, main treatment, and supportive treatment used in the older era, the additional factors were not "controlled." Consequently, the better results attained with new treatment might have been due to earlier diagnosis or better supportive treatment.
A second problem was the failure to use similar admission criteria for the patients included in the contrasted groups. For example, when surgical treatment given judgmentally to "operable" patients is compared against nonsurgical treatment given to "inoperable" patients, the subsequent triumphs of surgery are often attributable not to the surgery but to the better pretherapeutic prognosis of the "operable" patients.
A third problem was produced by the often inadvertent use of different methods or criteria for decisions about "'success" or "failure" in observing and recording the outcome of treatment in the compared groups. Furthermore, when the outcome was a subjective event, such as relief of symptoms, a clinician (and patient) who expected a particular treatment to be effective could often convert the expectation into a selffulfilling prophecy when the response to treatment was experienced and noted.
A fourth problem was really statistical, rather than scientific. A success rate of 50% for a new treatment might be hailed as a major achievement in doubling the success rate of 25% for the old treatment, but the actual numerical values under contrast could have been as small as 2/4 vs 1/4. For these small groups, the observed distinctions could easily arise by chance alone if the two treatments were actually equivalent.
Advantages of randomization. The use of randomization as a method for allocating treatments in comparative trials was not specifically intended to address any of these four problems. The problems can be solved by 767 any type of research plan that arranges for treatments to be compared concurrently, in groups of adequate size, comprising subjects who fulfill similar criteria for admission to the study, and who are observed thereafter with similar objective procedures. By making the assignment of treatment unpredictable, the role of randomization was to prevent a fifth problem: the additional bias that might occur when treatments are selected judgmentally in the basic context of a research plan that calls for concurrent comparison, adequate size, similar eligibility, and similar follow-up observations.
If the other four problems are taken care of, the impact of this fifth problem will vary with the types of compared treatments. If the principal treatment under investigation has some strong contraindicationssuch as the co-morbidity or clinical severity that may militate against the use of surgery, antocoagulants, or other powerful agents -the contraindicating conditions will usually be accompanied by a worse prognosis in patients who are denied the principal treatment. This source of pretherapeutic "susceptibility bias" can be reduced or removed by the demand that all patients under comparison be equally eligible to receive all of the compared treatments. If there are no compelling clinical mandates to give or avoid any of the compared treatments, the use of similar eligibility criteria will have less importance in removing susceptibility bias.
Regardless of the effects of similar eligibility criteria, randomization has the vital role of removing or reducing the susceptibility bias that can arise when treatments are actually assigned. Thus, although medical vs surgical treatment might be compared only in patients who are all "operable," randomization would prevent surgery from being selectively chosen for operable patients with the best prognoses.
The majestic achievements of randomization, although often ascribed to the stochastic virtues of chance assignments, really arise from the prophylaxis of the fifth problem. By necessitating the advance planning of an experiment, a randomized trial can solve the first four problems almost as a by-product. In a randomized trial the treatments are compared concurrently, with special efforts made to eliminate unauthorized "contamination"; the patients are diagnosed with similar methods and admitted with similar pretherapeutic criteria; the follow-up observations can be arranged with objectivity and, if necessary, with "double blind" procedures; and the statistician can calculate the group sizes needed for the results to sustain claims about "significance." With these four problems managed as part of the routine plans, randomization makes its majestic contribution by helping avoid the fifth problem. The clinical situation is much more difficult, however, when the agent is used prophylactically to prevent a target condition that is not present when treatment begins. In primary prevention, such as vaccination against poliomyelitis, the prophylaxis is intended to thwart the future development of a disease. In secondary prevention the prophylaxis is aimed at avoiding or retarding the adverse consequences of an established disease. For this prophylactic role, an agent having an established remedial effect as its short-term primary action is used to prevent a secondary long-term effect. Examples of this type of secondary prophylaxis are the attempt to prevent vascular complications by altering hemostatic mechanisms or by lowering blood sugar, blood pressure, or blood lipids in patients with a variety of ailments including coronary artery disease, cerebrovascular disease, diabetes mellitus, and hypertension. Another common example of treatment aimed at secondary prevention is the effort to avoid or retard death by giving various antineoplastic therapies to patients with cancer.
If we recall some of the major ambiguities, disappointments, controversies, and confusions that have occurred after randomized trials in the past two decades, we find that almost all the problems have been associated with studies of prophylactic agents, most often in circumstances of secondary prevention. Cardiologists need no reminder about the controversies that have raged, and that still flourish, in coronary disease alone after randomized trials for the prophylactic beneVol. 70, No. 5, November 1984 fits of anticoagulants, clofibrate, vasodilators, sulfinpyrazone, aspirin, dipyridamole, intracoronary streptokinase, bypass surgery, and multiple risk factor intervention.
Problems produced by duration and sample size in trials of prophylactic therapy. Because the outcome event is something to be prevented, trials of prophylactic therapy have two major handicaps that do not occur in studies of remedial agents. The first handicap is that the patients must be followed for whatever duration is required to see whether the outcome event occurs. This duration is usually short in studies of treatment for faradvanced cancer because substantial proportions of the patients die within a year. The duration can be quite long, however, for therapeutic trials in which the individual observation periods are 5 years or more for such outcome events as recurrent myocardial infarction or other cardiovascular and cerebrovascular complications.
Aside from the logistic difficulties of maintaining people under observation for a protracted period, two main problems can arise when a trial has a prolonged duration. The first problem is the "contaminated" protocol. The longer the duration of the trial in each patient, the greater the opportunity for The vast expense of these activities becomes particularly distressing when the results do not provide the anticipated clarification of the issues under investigation.
Management of problems in cost, obsolescence, and contaminated protocols. None of the major problems just cited is easy to manage. Some of the expenses can be reduced by emulating the model developed by the Veterans Administration, which has pioneered in demonstrating that large-scale cooperative trials need not be conducted as fiscal colossi. The VA has achieved this desideratum by using an established network of hospitals, investigators who are salaried staff physicians at those hospitals, biostatistical coordinating centers that are part of the VA system, and an efficient VA committee mechanism for evaluating new studies and monitoring progress. This arrangement of hospitals, investigators, coordinating centers, and supervision is internal to the VA system and has avoided the large additional expenses needed for the ad hoc investigative personnel, special coordinating centers, university "overhead" costs, and project site-visit teams in trials conducted under other auspices. In exchange for the relatively low costs and high efficiency, however, the VA studies have been limited to topics that could be adequately investigated in VA patients. Although many large-scale randomized trials will have to be conducted outside the VA system, and although certain high expenses are inevitable, some of the costs might be substantially reduced if the sponsoring and investigative agencies were able to adopt some of the economies developed in the VA cooperative studies program.
A second major problem the hazard of technologic obsolescence is unavoidable in any form of research, as well as in randomized trials. For the relatively simple activities of laboratory research, the investigator can easily make and carry out the decision to stop a particular study when it seems unlikely to be productive. This decision is much more difficult, however, if the study is a large-scale trial that has required years of planning and that involves multiple institutions and investigators. If the investigators have committed a great deal of time, effort, and ego to the trial, they may not be coldly dispassionate in approaching the decision to stop it. To allow this type of decision to be made objectively, many large-scale trials today have established an external policy committee, from which the participating investigators are excluded. Although such committees were instituted mainly for deciding whether the accrued results of the treatments compared in an ongoing trial warranted a premature ending or postmature extension of the planned study, the committees might be given several additional assignments.
The committees could be asked to decide whether a trial should be stopped when the arrival of a powerful new technologic agent threatens the value of the results. A different type of "early-termination" decision might be considered when the early results of a trial indicate that the original objective of the study cannot be achieved because the intended plans have been too altered by reality. For PERSPECTIVE ly-termination decision might have saved enormous amounts of time, effort, money, and confusion in the MRFIT study,'7 when most of the "control" group was found to be receiving the same interventions as the "treated" group.
The difficulties just noted in the clofibrate and MRFIT studies are examples of the most thorny of the cited problems: the management of a contaminated protocol. This type of hazard will continue to arise in long-term studies when the assigned therapeutic agents do not act or are not maintained in the intended manner. No matter what solution is offered for the problem, the results will not satisfy everyone because the analysis of contamination requires a choice between conflicting policy options that can create and perpetuate inevitable controversies in randomized clinical trials.
Pragmatic vs fastidious policies in design and analysis. Regardless of whether a randomized trial is aimed at remedial or prophylactic therapy, every aspect of the design and analysis of the trial is affected by certain basic strategic decisions. The decisions arise from attitudes about why a trial is done, at whom it is aimed, what makes it pertinent, what makes it credible, and how its results are to be used. The attitudes behind these decisions often involve a choice of one of two fundamental but conflicting policies, each of which is reasonable and readily justified. Because only one of the two policies can be used, however, the subsequent results will often be unacceptable to adherents of the opposing policy. The controversies that arise in many randomized clinical trials are thus inevitable.
The two conflicting policies have been described in diverse ways and have received diverse names.' [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] Although the full details are beyond the scope of this essay, the conflict will be outlined here under the title of pragmatic vs fastidious policies. A more extensive discussion is presented elsewhere.7 23 In the pragmatic policy, a therapeutic trial is intended to ask and answer questions that are directly cogent for the "messy" realities of clinical practice. ized assignment, regardless of how the assignment may have been altered during the trial. Beyond these bare outlines, the two policies will have extensive ramifications in every aspect of what is done in a randomized trial to choose patients, decide on the compared treatments, select the outcome events, acquire data, retain ineligible or "lost" patients, analyze contaminated therapy, and cope with unexpected outcome events.
An example of the problems occurred in the celebrated controversy over the UGDP trial of treatment for patients with diabetes mellitus. The trial was planned and analyzed with a fastidious approach. The patients were chosen to have non-insulin-dependent diabetes; the oral agents were given in fixed dosages to allow "double-blinding"; the main outcome event was cardiovascular mortality, which had not been anticipated in the original design of the study; and the results were analyzed according to the originally assigned treatments, although many of the treatments had not achieved good regulation of glucose and although many of the patients had changed to other treatments during the course of the trial. All of these decisions were unacceptable to adherents of the pragmatic viewpoint, who wanted to determine the effect of careful glucose regulation in any type of diabetes, using "titration" of therapy, examining clinical morbidity and total mortality as outcome events, and analyzing results according to the treatments that had actually been received, not just those that were initially assigned.
Each of the fastidious and pragmatic policies can readily be defended and justified with both passionate rhetoric and dispassionate logic, but the same single trial can seldom be conducted with both policies and will seldom satisfy proponents of the opposing viewpoints. The fastidious policy has a scientific and statistical appeal because of its attention to a "clean," unbiased set of plans and analyses, but the results may not be directly cogent (and may be rejected) for clinical practice. The pragmatic policy is attractive for its attention to the needs of clinical science, but the results contain the hazard of a biased analysis and may be rejected for their statistical "messiness." Although certain compromises can be achieved, particularly if the most adamant proponents of the two viewpoints were more tolerant of the opposing position, many conflicts will be inevitable because the main demands of the two policies can seldom be attained in a single trial. Consequently, the attempt to prevent controversy by satisfying everyone would require that many therapeutic questions be resolved not with a single, large-771 scale, expensive randomized trial, but with several such trials -each conducted according to the appropriate policy choices.
Because the costs of such multiple activities would be prohibitive, the controversies and confusions that have occurred after many prominent randomized trials in the past two decades are destined to recur and to continue without resolution. The situation is reminiscent of the definition of tragedy as the destructive collision of two opposing protagonists, both of whom are right.
Observational approximations of randomized trials. Because randomized trials have developed such high scientific stature and acceptance, they are now accorded an almost religious sanctification24; the accusation of antiscientific heresy may be given to any suggestion that cause-effect relationships can be evaluated observationally without randomization. This type of fervent belief in the irreplaceable virtues of randomized trials can be maintained, however, only by ignoring two cogent scientific realities. The first reality is that randomized trials have not been (and cannot be) applied for many of the cause-effect relationships that must be evaluated in modern medical science. To study the etiologic effects of smoking, exercise, diets, and other factors that may cause disease in healthy people and to appraise suspicions about the adverse pathogenetic consequences attributed to clinical therapy with sexual hormones, diuretics, or other pharmaceutical substances, we have had to rely on observational epidemiologic research rather than randomized trials. The second reality, as discussed in this essay and elsewhere,7' 23 is that randomized trials are too difficult, too expensive, or too controversial for routine use in answering all the clinical questions that will arise in the future for a burgeoning diagnostic and therapeutic technology.
Whether we like it or not, most of our future decisions about medical practice, health care, and scientific technology will have to be made without evidence from randomized trials. To acknowledge this reality requires no loss of reverence, allegiance, or respect for the primacy of randomized trials as a "gold standard" in scientific research. Furthermore, we commit neither sacrilege nor disloyalty by recognizing that randomized trials cannot always be done, that they do not always yield unequivocal answers when done, and that alternative scientific methods must be developed to get satisfactory answers to questions for which randomized trials are either impossible or inadequate.
In a similar acknowledgment of reality, surgeons who prefer to operate in a suitably antiseptic environ- 
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The fifth problem, produced when treatment is assigned without randomization, is more difficult to solve, but reasonably effective approaches might be developed if thoughtful attention were given to the development of cogent prognostic analysis for patients' pretherapeutic status. 26 In current policies and attitudes about clinical research, however, the idea of a nonrandomized investigation usually evokes such horror that the scientific challenges are neither acknowledged nor considered. One way to mitigate this horror is to determine whether similar results were obtained when the same topic was studied in the same way with randomized and nonrandomized trials. Unfortunately, almost no data are available for such comparisons. Because various differences in the protocol may lead to conflicting results even in two apparently similar randomized trials,27 experimental and observational studies may often disagree because they asked different questions in different ways, not because one trial was randomized and the other was not. Even if the research protocols had similar components, however, the randomized and nonrandomized results-may not be comparable because the studies were not done concurrently or because the cited scientific principles were not adequately applied in the nonrandomized research.
In two recent instances where randomized and nonrandomized trials were devoted to the same topic, approached with similar protocols, and carried out with all of the three main scientific principles, the results of the two types of research were Since this essay is intended to identify problems and challenges, not to offer solutions, I shall not discuss details of the strategies and tactics7' 26, 30 with which scientific quality can be improved in nonrandomized research. The main points to bear in mind are that these improvements must be developed as a vital necessity of clinical and epidemiologic science, that the improvements will enhance the quality of randomized as well as nonrandomized studies, that the work offers a fundamental intellectual challenge in basic clinical investigation, and that the work will not be quick or easy. Since more than three decades of intensive effort were needed to establish randomized trials as a routine investigative activity and to recognize their limitations, we cannot expect the current problems to be solved overnight.
Because numbers are "the language of science,"'3 the work will need new forms of biostatistical creativity. Because any language, however, depends on basic information and reasoning, the fundamental activities will require that clinical investigators expand their creative horizons to give that scientific language a proper derivation, a sensible grammar, and a meaningful content.
